Contributing to democratic consolidation and sustainable peace in El Salvador and the Philippines : overcoming the quest for stability by Zulueta-Fülscher, Kimana
/2013Discussion Paper
Contributing to Democratic
Consolidation and Sustainable Peace
in El Salvador and the Philippines
Overcoming the Quest for Stability
Kimana Zulueta-Fülscher
 
 
Contributing to democratic consolidation  
and sustainable peace in El Salvador and the 
Philippines 
Overcoming the quest for stability 
 
 
 
 
 
Kimana Zulueta-Fülscher 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bonn 2013 
Discussion Paper / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik 
ISSN 1860-0441 
 
 
 
 
Die deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detail-
lierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufbar. 
The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed  
bibliographic data is available in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de.  
 
ISBN 978-3-88985-607-4 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr Kimana Zulueta-Fülscher, Senior researcher, Department “Governance, Statehood and Security” 
E-Mail: kimana.zulueta@die-gdi.de 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik gGmbH 
Tulpenfeld 6, 53113 Bonn 
 +49 (0)228 94927-0 
 +49 (0)228 94927-130 
E-Mail: die@die-gdi.de 
www.die-gdi.de  
Contributing to democratic consolidation and sustainable peace in El Salvador and the Philippines 
Abstract 
In the context of high levels of violence, El Salvador and the Philippines have had rela-
tively successful democratisation processes. Nonetheless, despite decades of external insti-
tutional support, both countries have not yet achieved peace, nor fully consolidated de-
mocracy. What explains the lack of effectiveness of external state-building and democra-
cy-support policies, and how could it be overcome? I argue that one explaining factor is 
the lack of commitment to pursue structural reforms, both from the donor and the partner 
side. It is what I call the “ownership dilemma”. With the connivance of local elites, exter-
nal donors mainly focus on capacitating certain state institutions, rather than on advancing 
the inclusiveness of the democratic system. Donors’ policies reflect the existence of unre-
solved conflicting objectives between the alleged goals of state-building and democracy-
support programmes – democratic consolidation and sustainable peace – and policies that 
both donors and partners are ready to implement. At the same time, however, as both case 
studies show, windows of opportunity enable donors to support change and overcome lo-
cal elites’ hesitations. 
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1 Introduction 
In an attempt to end endemic conflict and advance peace and stability, states such as El 
Salvador and the Philippines are engaging non-state armed groups in peace negotiations. 
However, the consensus in both theory and praxis is that the resulting peace agreements, 
while sufficient to secure short-term stability, are insufficient to secure sustainable peace 
in the absence of capable and legitimate institutions (Call 2012, 33; Paris / Sisk 2009, 1–2; 
see also Paris 2004).1 Still, decades-long external institutional-support has not led to dem-
ocratic consolidation and sustainable peace, not even to a sustained reduction in conflict 
levels. Why? And what can be done to overcome this situation? 
This paper assesses how donors2 engage peace processes and institutions in both El Salva-
dor and the Philippines in their support of democratic consolidation and sustainable peace. 
Policies aimed at strengthening the institutional framework refer in this paper to either 
state-building or democracy-support policies.3 Additionally, this paper identifies the main 
factors contributing to effective state-building and democracy-support policies in these 
specific country-contexts. 
Indeed, El Salvador and the Philippines seem to have little in common, as they differ with 
regards to a number of factors, such as location, geographical composition, population 
size, gross domestic product (GDP) growth and presence of natural resources. At the same 
time, these countries share a number of crucial characteristics. Both are presidential de-
mocracies with low levels of authority – resulting in high conflict rates – but relatively 
high levels of state capacity (Grävingholt / Ziaja / Kreibaum 2012; Call 2011; Besley / 
Persson 2011).4 I argue that these similarities shape not only the design but also the effec-
tiveness of democracy-support and state-building policies. 
                                                 
1  When this paper refers to a legitimate institutional framework, it is in reference to an inclusive and 
democratically organised institutional framework able to respond to the demands and grievances of 
large sectors of society. 
2  This paper uses the term “donor” or “external donor” to denote member states of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), as 
well as the development banks, such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the Inter-
American Development Bank and specific UN organisations. 
3  The OECD (2008, 2011) defined state-building as an “endogenous process to enhance capacity, 
institutions, and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relations.” Concurrently, Paris and Sisk 
define state-building as “a particular approach to peacebuilding, premised on the recognition that 
achieving security and development in societies emerging from civil war partly depends on the 
existence of capable, autonomous and legitimate governmental institutions” (2009, 1–2; Paris 2004). 
Democracy support can be defined as those policies “designed to foster a democratic opening in a non-
democratic country or to further a democratic transition in a country that has experienced a 
democratic opening” (see Carothers 1999, 6). Both policies overlap to a great extent, in as much as the 
given state accepts democracy as its governing system, and the democratic institutional build-up as one 
of its aims. 
4  This paper is part of a bigger German Development Institute (DIE) research project on “Democracy and 
Stability in Contexts of Fragility”. Both case studies were chosen using three distinct criteria: structural 
similarity in terms of state capacity, authority and legitimacy, following Grävingholt, Ziaja and 
Kreibaum’s (2012) multi-dimensional fragility typology; absence of a democratic relapse or improve-
ment in aggregate democracy levels (Polity IV); and increasing “governance and civil society” assis-
tance funds over the past 10 years (OECD/DAC). The time period we looked at spanned from 2002 to 
2012. 
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Assuming that external state-building and democracy-support policies will only have a 
limited impact in supporting peace and democracy, the analysis of El Salvador and the 
Philippines shows that these policies face two interrelated challenges. The first is what I 
call the “ownership dilemma”. Although the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
and the 2011 Busan Partnership documents asserted that “country ownership” was a cru-
cial factor for aid effectiveness, they assumed that partner countries already have “devel-
opment-oriented political leaderships” (Booth 2012, 537; Faust 2010). Political elites in 
both El Salvador and the Philippines, however, either reject or postpone the structural re-
forms necessary to build more inclusive and democratic institutions. The ownership di-
lemma flourishes when external donors thwart their own official goals – peace and democ-
racy – to abide by action plans agreed with governments unwilling to pursue reforms (Zü-
rcher 2011; Zürcher et al. 2013). 
The second challenge is that this ownership dilemma mirrors the existence of unresolved 
“conflicting objectives” between, on the one hand, supporting structural reforms aimed at 
democratic consolidation and at peace sustainability and, on the other hand, maintaining 
short- and medium-term stability (Grimm / Leininger 2012). External policies usually fo-
cus on enhancing the institutional capacity of the state rather than supporting inclusive and 
democratic institutions (Call 2012; Doyle / Sambanis 2000; Paris / Sisk 2009), thereby 
supporting short-term stability rather than long-term peace and democracy (Joshi 2013).5 
The analysis is based on field trips to El Salvador in November 2012 and to the Philip-
pines in February 2013.6 I used both secondary literature and 135 semi-structured inter-
views with key stakeholders – policy-makers, officials of donor organisations, civil socie-
ty representatives and experts – for data-gathering and triangulation. The ambition of the 
analysis is exploratory. 
The paper is structured as follows: section two compiles relevant theories that respond to 
the main research question: Why has sustainable peace and democratic consolidation been 
so difficult to reach after decades-long institutional support, and what can be done about 
it? It presents two interrelated claims: first, the ownership dilemma and conflicting objec-
tives as potential explanations for the lack of effectiveness of these policies, and second, 
windows of opportunity where external donors might be able to support leaps in the dem-
ocratic consolidation of a given country. These arguments are further exemplified in sec-
tions three and four through the analysis of the two case studies, El Salvador and the Phil-
ippines. In these sections, I first describe the institutional context that embeds the process 
of democratic consolidation and current peace processes in these countries. Second, I ana-
lyse the way in which external donors engage these processes, clarifying both challenges 
and opportunities for the effectiveness of their policies. Section five concludes. 
                                                 
5  Policy recommendations with regards to how to externally support the institutional framework in 
emerging democracies – such as El Salvador and the Philippines – when they aim at sustainable peace 
are limited (Grimm / Leininger 2012, 392; Zulueta-Fülscher 2014). 
6  The clustering of both countries within the same group is based on average 2007–2009 data. According 
to this baseline, the authority in both states was relatively low, whereas their capacity was significantly 
higher. Variation with regards to their state legitimacy is normal within this country cluster. 
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2 Contributing to democratic consolidation and sustainable peace 
The literature has repeatedly thematised the relationship between democratisation process-
es and conflict (Mansfield / Snyder 1995, 2002, 2005; Ward / Gleditsch 1998; Gleditsch / 
Ward 2000). Mansfield and Snyder (1995), the initiators of this debate, argue that there is 
a positive relationship between countries in transition to democracy and the likelihood of 
war. Later they specify that the positive relationship between democratisation and conflict 
only ensues in states that suffer from institutional weakness (Mansfield / Snyder 2002, 
2005). 
Therefore, in those states where the institutional framework is weak, Mansfield and 
Snyder (2005) contend that donors should prioritise strengthening institutions before 
committing to full-scale democracy support due to the risk of instability. But wherever 
state institutions have a certain capability, donors should gradually combine state-building 
policies with supporting democratic values and principles (see Carothers vs. Mansfield / 
Snyder 2007). 
Parallel to this literature, the latest peace- and state-building theory argues that for peace 
to be sustainable, state institutions need to be both capable and legitimate (Call 2012, 4; 
Joshi 2013; OECD 2011; Paris / Sisk 2009; World Bank 2011). A broadly legitimate insti-
tutional framework is one that includes, gives voice to and responds to demands and 
grievances of large sectors of society (Call 2012, 39). Such an inclusive institutional 
framework is, in turn, part and parcel of any well-developed democratic system (Savoia / 
Easaw / McKay 2010, 146). 
Limited institutional support and the ownership dilemma 
Both El Salvador and the Philippines are still consolidating democracies with increasingly 
well-functioning – but relatively exclusive – state institutions, mostly captured by a lim-
ited number of interest groups and political elites. The understanding that an imperfect 
institutional framework lies at the root of persisting conflict in these societies leads exter-
nal donors to focus their efforts on strengthening institutions through state-building and 
democracy-support measures (Fox / Hoelscher 2012). Despite institutional strengthening, 
however, crucial progress in terms of achieving peace sustainability has been slow and 
stimulated only by governments themselves initiating peace negotiations.7 
One possible explanation for this lack of effectiveness of external support concentrates on 
the donor side. Part of the literature claims that state-building operations focus more on 
capacity-building than on creating an inclusive and democratic – and therefore legitimate 
– institutional framework that could ensure sustainable peace. Some authors argue that 
there are contradictions and dilemmas inherent to state-building policies that impede a 
deeper engagement or higher effectiveness of external policies (Paris / Sisk 2009).8 Others 
                                                 
7  The very fact that these countries suffer from violent conflicts today can be understood as the failure of 
previous state-building measures, as state institutions are not “capable, autonomous and legitimate” 
(Paris / Sisk 2009, 1) enough to deal with conflict, in turn enabling groups to challenge or undermine 
the state. 
8  Some of the contradictions and dilemmas Paris and Sisk (2009, 307–309) refer to include footprint 
dilemmas, duration dilemmas, participation dilemmas, dependency dilemmas and coherence dilemmas. 
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argue that there is a deliberate focus on institutional capacity that excludes support for an 
inclusive institutional framework (Call 2012; Schneckener 2011). According to these au-
thors, the focus of external donors on institutional capacity is precisely what limits the 
impact of state-building policies (see the UN SG Policy Committee Decision, May 2007). 
I argue, concurrently, that these explanations are only symptoms of a broader issue that I 
term the ownership dilemma. That is, partner governments are unwilling to pursue struc-
tural reforms, and donor countries concede to development action-plans designed – and 
usually also implemented – by partner governments’ institutions (UNDP Country Pro-
gramme Document 2012–2016, 7).9 Capacity-building, therefore, becomes a priority in 
development plans, as opposed to creating an inclusive or democratic institutional frame-
work. An inclusive and democratic institutional framework likely requires structural re-
forms.10 Hence, if institutions are relatively exclusive – not representative, participative, 
open and accountable – making them inclusive or democratic would require that tradition-
al elites cooperate and relinquish at least part of their power (Acemoglu / Robinson 2012; 
Call 2012).11  
Two different issues concur in this regard: first, the reticence of local elites to give up 
power, and second, the need to give up power when establishing inclusive or democratic 
political institutions. Acemoglu and Robinson argue that “there is no necessity for a socie-
ty to develop or adopt the institutions that are best for economic growth or the welfare of 
its citizens, because other institutions may be even better for those who control politics 
and political institutions” (2012, 44; see also Booth 2012; Faust 2010; Zürcher et al. 
2013).12 In other words, if inclusive institutions lead to a change in the balance of powers 
– and to some elites either losing power in favour of other elites or in favour of a majority 
– elites in power will likely oppose this type of institutional reform. 
At the same time, external donors are not always ready to use their own political leverage 
if local elites resist. According to Zürcher (2011, 88), in peace-building contexts, interna-
tional actors are often ready to compromise their own values and principles – democracy, 
in this case – whenever they do not wish to risk instability. This lack of commitment on 
                                                 
9  The role of local (or government) elites has gained traction in the recent past within the peace-building 
(and generally, the development) literature (Leftwich 2010). Especially in emerging democracies – 
where civil society organisations and/or political parties are either not representative, only partially rep-
resentative or too weak – local ownership usually means the ownership of local (or government) elites. 
10  This is, of course, not a new phenomenon, but one that has been analysed with increasing interest since 
the 2005 OECD Paris Declaration, which calls upon donors to take “country ownership” into account, 
but without defining what exactly is meant by country ownership, government ownership or general 
public ownership. 
11  Charles Call (2012) “sees the consolidation of peace as dependent foremost on a state whose main 
social groups see the state as offering them acceptable levels of representation and participation” (Call 
2012, 226). Indeed, Call’s central finding is that political exclusion – rather than economic or social 
factors – plays the decisive role in most cases of civil war recurrence: political exclusion acts as a trig-
ger for renewed armed conflict. He refers to political exclusion as “the perceived or actual deprivation 
of an expected opportunity for former warring parties, or the social groups associated with them, to 
participate in state administration, through either appointed posts or elective office. In separatist 
struggles, those opportunities are concentrated in authority over a substate territory” (Call 2012, 4). 
12  Zürcher et al. talk about “adoption costs”, “shaped by whether actors feel they stand to gain or lose 
physical, political, and economic security by playing the democratic game” (2013, x). 
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the part of external donors may happen in any context where local elites oppose necessary 
institutional reforms. External donors will, as a consequence, refrain from resolutely push-
ing for those reforms.  
Conflicting objectives 
This ownership dilemma reflects the persistence of conflicting objectives in state-building 
and democracy-support policies. Grimm and Leininger (2012, 397) define conflicting ob-
jectives as “the clash of two competing goals, whereby the achievement of one goal is im-
paired by the achievement of the other goal” (see also Spanger / Wolff 2007). 
Although both scholars and practitioners acknowledge that inclusive and democratic insti-
tutions are necessary for sustainable peace (Acemoglu / Robinson 2012; Call 2012), exter-
nal donors often fall short of systematically supporting structural reforms that could lead 
to further inclusiveness and democratisation of national governance systems, for example 
by supporting the legislative or the political party system (Diamond 1994, 32; Keefer 
2008, 59; Merkel 2010). This is the result of formal or informal bargaining processes, by 
which external donors and local elites come to agree on the kind of institutional frame-
work they are both able and willing to support (Zürcher et al. 2013, 6). 
The result of these bargaining processes depends on a number of factors. According to 
Zürcher et al. (2013, 132), assuming that the priority of external donors is to support long-
term democratic consolidation and peace sustainability, the bargain will nonetheless result 
in prioritising short-term stability and postponing long-term peace and democracy, if the 
cost of adopting structural reforms is high for local elites and the leverage of external do-
nors is low.13 
Where this is the case, external donors may be more inclined to focus on strengthening the 
institutional capacity of the state and only supporting civil society organisations (CSOs) 
after government agreement. In those rare occasions where external donors decide to sup-
port CSOs to pressure the government for reforms, the leverage of CSOs will be limited, 
at best. This is the case when either external donors are unwilling or unable to back these 
policies with direct (diplomatic) pressure, or in the absence of inclusive, democratic and 
reform-oriented political parties able to support the process from within (Diamond 1994, 
15). 
External donors, for the most part, demur supporting both political parties and parlia-
ments. There are at least two reasons for this: first, a myriad of stakeholders regard the 
direct assistance of these actors by external donors as undue interference in domestic af-
fairs; and second, direct assistance for both of these institutions depends on demand, and 
demand is low, if existent at all (Carothers 1999). At the same time, external donors also 
forgo other instruments at their reach, such as diplomatic pressure and conditionality 
clauses, to bring about crucial reforms in these areas.14 
                                                 
13  The opposite would be true if adoption costs were low and the leverage of donors was high. 
14  According to Zürcher et al. (2013, 140), when donors are unable or unwilling to apply conditionality, or 
lack the coherence or the commitment to support democracy over other concerns, then “aid does not ef-
fectively increase donor leverage or mitigate adoption costs.” 
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Generally, external donors pursue democracy-support policies in a non-intrusive, coopera-
tive, top-down fashion, always in agreement with the relevant local authority and rarely 
challenging the status quo (Grimm / Leininger 2012, 406). This type of external support 
runs the risk of ignoring precisely those social and political structures that are either at the 
root of conflict or that could represent a viable solution to conflict if properly targeted, 
that is, political parties in the legislative. At the same time, it runs the risk of ignoring the 
process of democratic consolidation altogether, and therefore neglecting one of the main 
sources of sustainable peace (Savun / Tirone 2011, 241). 
Leaps in the democratic consolidation of a country, however, do not necessarily depend on 
interventions by external actors. In fact, such processes might ensue in spite of – or inde-
pendently of – external interventions, as I argued before. Windows of opportunity might 
arise, bringing about change and forcing local and external actors to revamp their relation-
ship. If successful, these windows of opportunity might become critical junctures (Ace-
moglu / Robinson 2012; Capoccia / Kelemen 2007; Mahoney 2001). These include mo-
ments in history where change hits path dependency, irrevocably altering (institutional) 
behaviours. The role of international actors may be to support the emergence of these 
windows of opportunity, but more likely support their survival and sustainability 
(Schmitter / Brouwer 1999). 
In short, an inclusive or democratic institutional framework is a necessary factor for sus-
tainable peace. External donors, however, have mostly focused on institutional capacity 
rather than on supporting the emergence of inclusive institutions. One possible explana-
tion relates to the ownership dilemma. This dilemma partly mirrors conflicts between the 
overall goal of policy initiatives – sustainable peace and democratic consolidation – and 
the actual practice of capacity-building. Still, change is possible, but more often than not it 
materialises out of internal dynamics, irrespective of external support. In these rare occa-
sions, external donors have the opportunity to support change and its sustainability. 
The next two sections exemplify these dynamics and analyse the role of external donors in 
supporting sustainable peace and democratic consolidation, given the political elites’ rela-
tively low commitment to reform. In the case of El Salvador, as opposed to the Philip-
pines, we see how external interventions in some instances decisively contributed to leaps 
in the democratic consolidation process, precisely by supporting these windows of oppor-
tunity. 
3 El Salvador 
3.1 Context: democratic consolidation and the state 
El Salvador went through a democratic transition in the 1980s and 1990s, during and after 
a 12-year civil war between the government of El Salvador and a left-leaning guerrilla 
group, the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN). The war ended 
with the 1992 Chapultepec Peace Accord. This Peace Accord set the stage for a number of 
economic and political reforms that were to deeply transform the state’s institutional 
framework (Call 2002, 832). Institutions were to become more democratic, and therefore 
more accountable and responsive to the demands and grievances of most citizens (Rubio-
Fabián et al. 2004). These reforms were not to happen overnight – 20 years after the Peace 
Accord, progress in El Salvador’s democratic consolidation is still ongoing. 
Contributing to democratic consolidation and sustainable peace in El Salvador and the Philippines 
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Parallel to this consolidation process, levels of violent conflict have steadily risen since 
the end of the war. Violent conflict has been mostly related to organised crime, specifical-
ly violent youth gangs, such as the Mara Salvatrucha (MS13) and the Barrio 18.15 In 2011 
the Salvadorian government decided to take the short road to peace, “facilitating” talks 
among both youth gangs. 
In this subsection, I first focus on the sometimes hesitant process of democratic consolida-
tion in El Salvador, specifically concentrating on the evolving interaction among state 
powers and the newly-won independence of the judiciary. Next, I focus on the peace pro-
cess, whose sustainability depends on the development of an inclusive and democratic 
institutional framework. In the following subsection, I analyse the engagement by external 
donors of both the peace process and the process of institutional reform, addressing oppor-
tunities and challenges for the effectiveness of their policies. 
Consolidating democracy 
With regards to the system of government, the 1983 Constitution established a presidential 
system with a multiparty legislative, the National Assembly. The Salvadorian electoral 
system favours a three-party system, wherein none of the two major political parties can 
itself obtain a simple majority in the Assembly (Artiga-González 2008).16 To achieve a 
majority, de facto the two largest parties need to agree to a common position, or one of 
them needs to look for a hinge coalition partner to boost its weight in the Assembly.17 This 
is crucial because, theoretically, it curbs presidential powers, as the political party close to 
the President will need to find at least one coalition partner to guarantee its majority in the 
Assembly. 
It became even more important following the signing of the 1994 Peace Accord, because 
the former guerrilla group, the FMLN, entered the political process as a political party. 
The inclusion of the FMLN in the Salvadorian political process fundamentally changed 
the existing balance of powers in the National Assembly. Before 1994 the Assembly had 
been overwhelmingly conservative, but after 1994 it increasingly included left-leaning 
constituencies. The FMLN started standing for elections in 1994, constituted the second 
largest political party in the National Assembly until 2000, and became the largest party 
after that. In 2009 the FMLN candidate – Mauricio Funes – finally won the presidency.18 
                                                 
15  On the one hand, rising conflict levels hamper the democratic consolidation process, clogging the judi-
cial system and further polarising parties in parliament. On the other hand, they are the consequence of 
insufficient institutional consolidation and lack of opportunities in the broader sense. 
16  The two major political parties in the Salvadorian National Assembly from 1994 onward were the con-
servative Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA) and the left-leaning (former guerilla group) 
FMLN. The third-largest party was, until 2009, the conservative Partido de Conciliación Nacional, sub-
stituted in 2012 by the Gran Alianza por la Unidad Nacional, an ARENA splinter party headed by for-
mer President Tony Saca.  
17  A third option to reach a majority in the National Assembly would require representatives from one of 
the two largest parties to leave the party cadre and to join another party.  
18  Broad sectors of society saw Mauricio Funes as a carrier of hope and instigator of much-needed 
change, as stagnation was starting to seize previous transformation efforts. Funes was neither part of the 
traditional political elite nor a party member before becoming the FMLN candidate. He was a renowned 
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This change in the balance of powers affected a number of state institutions that depended 
on the relative weight of political parties in the legislative, such as the judiciary. The con-
stitution establishes the need for two-thirds majorities in the Assembly to elect or dismiss, 
for example, the Attorney General or the magistrates of the Supreme Court, including the 
magistrates of the Constitutional Chamber. This should have ensured the de-politicisation 
and independence of judicial nominations, as it calls for broad-based coalitions in the Na-
tional Assembly. However, deep political-party polarisation in the National Assembly 
hampers the constitution of “great coalitions”. And in those instances where the two larg-
est parties in the Assembly are unable to agree to common candidates – or unable to reach 
a sufficient majority – an impasse ensues. 
However, significant leaps in democratic consolidation have occurred in the process of 
resolving some of these impasses. In 2009, for instance, after the presidential and legisla-
tive elections, four out of five magistrates to the Constitutional Chamber were to be newly 
elected. Disagreements among both major political parties as to their preferred candidates 
meant that none of them were able to reach a two-thirds majority in the National Assem-
bly. The impasse was only broken by President Funes, whose mediation was necessary to 
find compromise candidates. Four independent judges were finally nominated for a nine-
year term. This was an essential improvement to a “judicial system [that still] remained 
weak, inefficient, antiquated, overly partisan, and subject to corruption” (Call 2002, 859) 
almost 20 years after the signing of the Peace Accord. It was also the sign that domestic 
and external observers of the democratic consolidation process in El Salvador had been 
looking for: a domestic reformist figure who would work to overcome political party po-
larisation and strengthen judicial independence – both issues being key to fighting endem-
ic corruption and crime. 
These judges had indeed promised to start decongesting the Constitutional Chamber by 
delivering judgments on a number of pending cases. But their sentences were far from 
uncontroversial, as they touched upon key political institutions and powers, such as the 
executive, the legislative, political parties and even the media. For example, they enabled 
independent candidates to stand for elections; they ruled for open – as opposed to closed 
and blocked – lists of candidates for elections to avoid political party elites from directly 
nominating parliamentarians after elections; and they restricted presidential discretionary 
budget use, which, from then on, had to be approved beforehand by the National Assem-
bly. Essentially, they defended the constitution as the legitimate regulatory frame for co-
existence, a true breakthrough in democratic terms (see Olson 1993).19 
As a consequence of these rulings, however, a new dynamic started to take shape. Both 
executive and legislative powers confronted the Constitutional Chamber, which was clear-
                                                                                                                                                   
 
independent political journalist, with a high reputation and legitimacy, campaigning to fight inequality, 
violence and corruption.  
19  On the “improbable transition from autocracy to democracy”, Olson claims that “autocracy is 
prevented and democracy permitted by the accidents of history that leave a balance of power or 
stalemate – a dispersion of force and resources that makes it impossible for any one leader or groups to 
overpower all of the others” (1993, 573). What I claim is that stalemates may also induce transitioning 
democracies to democratic leaps, despite initial reticence from political elites. 
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ly an attempt to undermine its newly-won independence. In June 2011, the executive 
passed the so-called 743 decree, which was to force the Constitutional Chamber to vote by 
unanimity, effectively immobilising this institution.20 Pressure from both civil society and 
part of the international community contributed to the final revocation of the decree and 
the continuation of the reform process. 
After the May 2012 legislative elections, another incident displayed the attempts by state 
powers to thwart judicial independence. The National Assembly was to nominate a new 
Attorney General. Political positions were as polarised as ever. The FMLN nominated its 
own candidate before the new National Assembly was sworn in, that is, while it still had a 
sufficient majority in the National Assembly in coalition with other parties. The Constitu-
tional Chamber declared this nomination unconstitutional, but the case was brought to the 
Central-American Court of Justice, whose competency in this case was unclear. Again it 
was pressure from civil society and the international community that eventually safe-
guarded judicial independence, by forcing the FMLN and the executive to accept the sen-
tence of the Constitutional Chamber and let the newly-elected National Assembly vote for 
a candidate (UN News Centre 2012). Still, it took the National Assembly until December 
2012 to find a sufficient majority to appoint a compromise candidate. 
These cases and other similar ones allow for some preliminary conclusions. First, the elec-
tion of a reformist presidential candidate from the FMLN constituted a window of oppor-
tunity for the democratic consolidation of El Salvador. However, his reformist credentials 
were soon to be tested, crucially with regards to supporting the independence of the judi-
ciary. Unfortunately, Funes’ readiness to support structural reforms was short-lived and 
the dynamics of institutional capture continued in attempts to undermine judicial inde-
pendence (see Call 2002, 853). The election of independent magistrates to the Constitu-
tional Chamber in 2009, however, also motivated CSOs and external actors to raise their 
voices and pressure both the executive and the legislative to play by the rules, contributing 
to yet another leap in the democratic consolidation of El Salvador. 
Second, without external pressure, and in absence of a significant political party law,21 
political parties in the Assembly are more likely to favour those institutions that will ena-
ble them to maintain their privileges rather than those that will threaten those privileges 
(Cepeda Ulloa 2001; Acemoglu / Robinson 2012). The long-term sustainability of the 
newly-acquired judicial independence is therefore unclear, as political parties will likely 
just wait for their next chance to remove the magistrates. 
Third, without the much-needed sustainability of judicial independence at the highest lev-
el, it will be more difficult for other courts at the local and regional levels to effectively 
fight corruption, patronage and violence. Although standards have considerably improved 
in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and transparency at all levels (Call 2002), without a 
fully functioning and independent Supreme Court and Constitutional Chamber enforcing 
the rule of law from above, all advances made at the lower levels will be limited, at best 
                                                 
20  Four out of five judges of the Constitutional Chamber were considered to be independent, but the fifth 
judge was linked to the conservative ARENA.  
21  A political-party law was passed in February 2013. It moves away from what civil society organisations 
had proposed, in terms of mandating internal democratic proceedings for political parties, and having to 
be transparent about private donations (see below).  
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(Carothers 2006). This relative lack of independence and capacity of the judicial sector at 
large increases the sense of impunity of broad sectors of society, and corruption and vio-
lence therefore prevails. 
Sustaining peace 
When the institutional framework is weak, the ability of the state to curb both corruption 
and violence – including criminal violence and organised crime – is limited. Youth gangs 
are a case in point. While constituting a symptom of both societal and institutional weak-
nesses – not least being the lack of employment opportunities and inclusive growth – 
gangs further destabilise and undermine the institutional framework by, for instance, ham-
pering development, inhibiting investments or further clogging the judicial and peniten-
tiary system (Boyce 1996). This phenomenon is predominant in three Central American 
countries, including El Salvador.  
Furthermore, formal reforms in the security sector after the war “did not lead to fully ac-
countable, responsive citizen-oriented public security” (Call 2002, 844; Zinecker 2007). 
Some central issues with regards to the police include, even today, high levels of corrup-
tion, lack of trust from the population and broad human rights violations, aside from a 
critical lack of resources. Policies of “mano dura” [tough hand] and “super mano dura” 
[super tough hand] – enacted in 2003 and 2005 by two consecutive conservative (ARE-
NA) governments, in addition to the 2007 law against organised crime – reinforced re-
pressive behaviours among security forces and was ultimately unsuccessful in curbing the 
violence (Cruz 2010; Zinecker 2007). 
By the end of 2011, the Salvadorian government decided to engage in a heterogeneous 
“pacification process” – the truce – where the interlocutors included the two largest youth 
gangs in the country, Mara Salvatrucha, or MS13, and Barrio 18. These youth gangs are 
allegedly responsible for 80 per cent of the total number of homicides in the country.22 By 
the end of 2012, the results of the truce were generally positive – a reduction in the homi-
cide rate of more than 50 per cent. Still, the process had been conceived as profoundly 
non-inclusive and non-transparent. The National Assembly had not played any significant 
role, nor did, for instance, the business sector, which could have been a crucial element in 
securing the long-term sustainability of the process.23 
Furthermore, peace sustainability depends on an institutional framework that is able to 
respond to the demands and grievances of most sectors of society once an agreement has 
been reached. Institutions should serve to prevent and to respond to conflict dynamics. In 
addition, they should include not only a capable police force, judicial system and general 
                                                 
22  Facilitators to the truce included a former FMLN leader, Raúl Mijango, a catholic bishop, Father 
Colindres, and (informally) the then newly-appointed Minister of Justice and Security (now security 
advisor for the President), former General Munguía Payés, with the direct support of the Organisation 
of American States. 
23  Only at the end of 2012, when the second phase of the process began, did the facilitators of the conflict 
start calling for the inclusion of different sectors of society – crucially, the business sector. This sector 
was to ensure investments and job opportunities for ex-gang members, which would assist the 
sustainability of the reduction in conflict levels. But the majority of the business sector, however, was 
highly reluctant to engage, as was suggested in different interviews, also those with the business 
community in San Salvador.  
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administration, but also an accountable executive, a responsible parliament and democrat-
ic political parties. Unfortunately, the executive has been slow in opening up the peace 
process to the public, and has been even slower in moving forward with some structural 
reforms that could decisively democratise state institutions. 
The attempt to undermine judicial independence and the “facilitation” of a peace process 
among criminal groups reflect the two conflicting objectives referred to in the previous 
chapter. The government clearly is prioritising stability by attempting to reduce homicide 
rates and by supporting institutional reforms, but only if they help fight short-term insta-
bility. However, the executive is much more ambiguous about democratic reforms when 
these have a direct impact on its powers, for example an independent judiciary or demo-
cratic political parties (Boyce 1996, 10). Now, how do international donors behave in a 
context where the government might be keener on resolving the (symptomatic) lack of 
stability than substantially reforming the institutional system and deepening democracy? 
3.2 Supporting peace and democracy from outside 
Contributing to sustainable peace? 
Resolving violent conflict and crime in El Salvador – and in the region – constitutes a top 
priority for most donors in their country- or regional strategies. Donors supported the 
regional organisation System for Central-American Integration, for instance, in publishing 
the Central-American Security Strategy in June 2011. This strategy included four key 
areas that governments should focus on in their fight against crime, namely repression; 
crime prevention; rehabilitation, reintegration and prison security; as well as institutional 
strengthening. Most donors have been keen in the past to support states in crime 
prevention and institutional strengthening. As early as November 2012, some of them 
seemed open to the possibility of contributing to rehabilitation, reintegration and prison 
security – an area they had previously avoided. The aim was to support the sustainability 
of the truce. 
All donor representatives interviewed coincided in their assessment that the sustainability 
of the truce depended both on the process becoming more inclusive and transparent, as 
well as on an institutional framework able to deal with the demands and grievances of 
different sectors of society. With regards to the peace process, only the Organization of 
American States was directly involved as an external “legitimator” to the process and as a 
mediator between different stakeholders that had initially been excluded from the process, 
such as the business sector and various CSOs. Due to the heterogeneous nature of the 
peace process itself, the role of embassies and other international donor organisations has 
been far more detached. Most of them continue working on crime prevention, mostly en-
gaging youth and women at the community level, and strengthening the institutional 
framework of the Salvadorian state. But none of their measures, as was repeatedly sug-
gested, have been directly related to the truce. 
The other element that allegedly contributes to the sustainability of the truce is the pres-
ence of capable and responsive state and non-state institutions. According to the Creditor 
Reporting System of the OECD/DAC, however, donors focus their “governance and civil 
society” sector assistance on a limited number of institutions and organisations. There is a 
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fairly consistent and significant concentration on the capacity development of state institu-
tions, through engagement with public sector institutions, the bureaucracy, and the legal 
and judicial system, including support for anti-corruption policies and security-sector re-
form (mainly financed by the United States). But on the other hand, there is a virtual ab-
sence of assistance towards capacitating the legislative, political parties or the media.24 
Additionally, support for “democratic participation and civil society organisations” has 
been decreasing (championed in the past by Spain), although Spain maintains its assis-
tance with regards to “women’s equality organisations and institutions”, which has in-
creased since 2003, and reached approximately US$ 5 million in 2011.25 
Most donors address government institutions directly through technical or financial 
assistance, advisory work and training. The United States, for instance, supports the 
justice system in its implementation of the law by working with the office of the Attorney 
General, training judges to be able to decongest the criminal justice system, improving 
community-police relations and increasing the capacity of investigative crime units. At the 
same time, most bilateral and multilateral donors support CSOs that are trying to increase 
their participation in public policy planning and evaluation – at the very least by asking 
them for advice – as well as supporting them in their work within local communities 
(Macdonald 1997; Banks / Hulme 2012). These dynamics, however, also expose at least 
one key aspect of the Salvadorian political system that donors assess as crucial but mostly 
fail to address, namely insufficiently democratic and transparent political parties and the 
resulting polarisation in the legislative and the media. 
Challenges and opportunities of supporting peace and democracy 
One of the reasons why donors focus mainly on capacity-building of state institutions – 
and to a lesser extent on CSOs – is the way in which development assistance is negotiated 
and agreed upon. The government largely negotiates and agrees separate bilateral multi-
annual action plans with each donor organisation. The role of CSOs in the planning phase 
is mostly of an advisory kind. The government furthermore insists on its indispensable 
role as a broker in the coordination of international donors,26 and on its prerogative of de-
ciding which areas it wants international donors to concentrate on. 
                                                 
24  Briefly on the media, the two largest newspapers – La Prensa Gráfica and Diario de Hoy – are owned 
by the right-wing Salvadorian business class. There are several digital media, but only one of them 
appears to pursue investigative journalism, El Faro. But only the Open Society Institute officially 
supports it as an external donor. Although the UN lists El Faro as one of its partner organisations, I was 
unable to find the UN’s logo on El Faro’s website.   
25  According to the Creditor Reporting System of the OECD/DAC, the three largest donors to El Salvador 
for the 10 years prior to 2011 – and despite the financial crisis – included the United States (45 per 
cent), Spain (20 per cent) and the European Union (9 per cent). From 2002 to 2011, total official devel-
opment assistance averaged approximately US$ 300 million every year (for a total GDP in 2011 of US$ 
23 billion for approximately 6 million inhabitants), of which, in average, approximately 14 per cent – or 
US$ 40 million – was dedicated to “government and civil society”; see online: http://stats.oecd.org. 
These data have to be taken with special prudence, as, for instance, the World Bank is one of the largest 
multilateral donors to El Salvador, but assistance is not reported through the OECD system. 
26  At the same time, lack of coordination within government institutions sometimes hampers donor 
coordination and slows down implementation (Interviews San Salvador). Lack of coordination unfolds 
either between the deputy minister for cooperation under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the under-
secretary of state under the presidency, or between the executive and the legislative (La Prensa Gráfica 
2012). 
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Unsurprisingly perhaps, the main priority of the government has been, for now, maintain-
ing stability, rather than pursuing structural reforms that could potentially endanger stabil-
ity by threatening the status quo, for example the independence of the judiciary, as was 
previously mentioned, or democratically organised political parties (Call 2002, 849). Ac-
emoglu and Robinson (2012) call this the fear of “creative destruction”, which, according 
to them, lies at the root of institutional inertia. 
At the same time, bilateral donors are also reluctant to get involved in such political un-
dertakings as supporting political parties, parliament or media. Political party foundations 
usually assume this responsibility, but only in cases where political parties themselves call 
for assistance. Otherwise, their presence is limited to organising workshops and trainings 
with uncertain short- and medium-term impacts. This is an example of what I previously 
called the ownership dilemma. 
Bilateral and multilateral donors focus mostly on capacity-building at the state and non-
state levels at the request – or with the connivance of – the executive. Almost exceptional-
ly, donors might support CSO initiatives to pressure both the executive and the legislative 
for reforms. For instance, the European Union (EU), as the lead donor, supported a group 
of Salvadorian independent think tanks – Iniciativa Social para la Democracia and Funda-
ción Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo, among others – on a project about “Political rights and 
the political party law: strengthening the link between the representative and the repre-
sented.” This project ended up as a political party bill in the National Assembly in Sep-
tember 2012. In February 2013 the Assembly approved a slimmed-down version of the 
bill, in which those articles that referred to transparency on private donations were attenu-
ated (FUSADES 2013). 
Thus, without external pressure, the impact of CSOs pressuring the executive for reforms 
is limited. On the other hand, of course, donors walk a tightrope between their own dimin-
ishing leverage, with regards to consolidating democracies, and the democratic principles 
they claim to support. Several interviewees (San Salvador), however, suggested that they 
would welcome a more consistent use of diplomatic pressure and conditionality clauses, as 
had happened after the war.27 Some recent positive examples can be depicted, as diplomat-
ic pressure that was added to grass-roots civil society mobilisations had a crucial impact in 
forcing both the executive and the legislative to abide by rulings from the Constitutional 
Chamber, in turn generating leaps in the democratic consolidation of the country. 
In conclusion, the realistic expectations of donors should be that their impacts on the 
emergence of democratic institutions in El Salvador is – and will be – limited. This par-
tially relates to the fact that the planning and coordination of development assistance pro-
grammes depends on an executive (and a legislative) that is only partially committed to 
reform. Still, when reform happens despite the blockade from some of the stakeholders, 
donors have the opportunity to help support it and make it sustainable. Usually, this hap-
pens by further capacitating state institutions or by supporting NGOs in urging the state 
for reforms. Occasionally, as we have seen, donors successfully use their diplomatic lev-
erage to pressure the state for reforms. Rarely, some donors, specifically the United States, 
                                                 
27  After the war, for instance, only conditionality and international pressure made the government purge 
the army, and thereby abide by what the Salvadorian Truth Commission had mandated (Call 2002, 836; 
Boyce 1996, 5, on a criticism of dealings by international donors regarding conditionality). 
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do support reformist figures from within certain institutions to push their transformation 
agendas (Interviews San Salvador, Washington, DC). The success of external interven-
tions likely lies in the combination of all these different measures. 
4 The Philippines 
4.1 Context: democratic consolidation and the state 
In 1986 the Philippines started its own transition to democracy after President Ferdinand 
Marcos tried once again to steal the presidential elections. He was subsequently over-
thrown by the famous “people power” revolution in the streets of Manila (Thompson 
2010, 155). Soon thereafter, Cory Aquino – mother of the current President, Benigno Sim-
eon Aquino III – became the first President of the transition. During her mandate, Con-
gress passed the 1986 Constitution, setting the stage for a new (at least formally democrat-
ic) institutional framework. 
Despite the new constitution, existing accountability institutions and control mechanisms 
continued to be weak. In early 2001, “corruption charges against former film star and 
populist president Joseph Estrada sparked a middle class-led and military-backed [sec-
ond] ‘people-power coup’, later granted dubious constitutional legitimacy by the Supreme 
Court” (Thompson 2010, 156). His Vice-President, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, took over, 
ended Estrada’s term, stood for the 2004 elections, and presided – in defiance of strong 
opposition due to corruption and election fraud allegations – until 2010. 
In 2010, Benigno Simeon Aquino III – also known as Noynoy Aquino – won the presiden-
tial elections by a landslide, in elections generally perceived as free and fair.28 Decades of 
almost uninterrupted corruption at the highest level; growing inequality and migration 
despite high growth rates; and persisting violence led to calls for change. Aquino’s re-
formist agenda appealed to a majority of the population (and the international communi-
ty), as it represented an opportunity for structural reforms. 
In this subsection, I address one of the main challenges to the democratic consolidation 
process in the Philippines and to Aquino’s reformist agenda, namely the country-wide 
dynamics of institutional capture by political dynasties, and how this dynamic plays out in 
the state’s separation of powers. Next, I focus on the various peace processes, specifically 
the one taking place in the southern island of Mindanao with the Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front (MILF), whose sustainability depends on the development of a capable and inclu-
sive institutional framework at the national and regional levels. In the following subsec-
tion, I analyse how external donors engage the peace process and the process of institu-
tional reform, and what factors might contribute to the effectiveness of their policies. 
 
                                                 
28  The country-wide automation of the voting procedure, assisted by the US Agency for International 
Development and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, contributed to legitimising the 
elections, which were widely perceived as free and fair. This automation, however, did not address 
other widespread phenomena such as family voting, vote buying or fraudulent voters (Interviews 
Manila). 
Contributing to democratic consolidation and sustainable peace in El Salvador and the Philippines 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 15 
Consolidating democracy 
The system that embeds Aquino’s administration is one where family clans and political 
dynasties largely control economic and political institutions at the local, provincial and 
national levels. Already in 1993, the World Bank suggested that “Philippines policy mak-
ing has historically been captive to vested interests that have shaped economic policy to 
protect and enhance their privileged position, often to the detriment of national well-
being” (World Bank 1993, 169; see also Boyce 1996, 7). Institutional capture, moreover, 
hampers any real separation of powers at the state level and undermines the power of the 
state, in terms of its capacity, authority and legitimacy (Kreuzer 2008, 48; Kreuzer 2012, 
32; Neumann 2010, 71). 
Even though Aquino himself represents one of those political dynasties, he became Presi-
dent by promising to reform the system and make it more accountable and inclusive. His 
administration has indeed been very active in addressing some of the symptoms of institu-
tional weakness, such as the high levels of corruption, inequality and violence (see Besley 
/ Persson 2011, 386). Concrete policies enacted include: the impeachment of the chief 
justice of the Supreme Court for corruption allegations (The New York Times 2012); the 
arrest of former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on charges of electoral fraud (The 
Wall Street Journal 2011); political symbols for Aquino’s anti-corruption campaign; the 
reproductive health law that would have enabled the country’s poorest women to have 
access to birth control29; the revamp of the 2008-initiated conditional Cash Transfer Pro-
gram “to poor households, conditional upon investments in child education and health as 
well as the use of maternal health services” (Chaudhury / Friedman / Onishi 2013); and 
the renewed commitment to a peace agreement with the MILF. These policies have a 
short-term impact on citizens’ well-being and allegedly contribute to stability, at least in 
the short term. 
On the other hand, the long-term sustainability of these policies depends on structural re-
forms – or as some interviewees phrased it, on “institutionalising reforms”30 – that would 
address some of the challenges faced by the democratic consolidation of the Philippines. 
These challenges are generally related to the institutional capture by political dynasties or 
family clans, as well as to the insufficient separation of state powers. This reflects, for 
instance, in a weak political party system in which political parties only constitute “tempo-
rary political alliances” (Aceron 2009, 5) with no membership, allegiance, programme or 
distinct ideology. Furthermore, political dynasties apparently use political parties to com-
pete for power in the executive and legislative through formally democratic elections, ren-
dering both institutions non-accountable and non-transparent (Interviews Manila).31 An 
equally non-transparent judicial power and judicial appointments marred by political inter-
                                                 
29  It was suspended indefinitely by the Supreme Court on 16 July 2013. 
30  Many interviewees pointed to the fact that the sustainability of Aquino’s reforms depended on subse-
quent presidents pursuing similar reform agendas. Some also stressed the fact that, without institution-
alisation of reforms, these were not likely to survive in the long term, precisely because it was unlikely 
that successors to Aquino would have a similar reform agenda in mind (Interviews Manila, Davao).  
31  According to Kreuzer (2012, 32), “the core pattern of domination in everyday politics is personal con-
trol over material and non-material resources, as these are necessary elements for self-enrichment and 
the development and upholding of clientelistic networks. The persistence of widespread corruption and 
illegal activities suggests that the elite is not really interested in surmounting the problem.” 
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ference further increase the sense of impunity at every level (Vitug 2010). Insufficient 
capacity and high levels of corruption in the armed forces further add to this grim picture. 
One initial step to deal with some of these challenges would include the approval of a 
number of bills that are currently in the legislative awaiting presidential prioritisation. 
These include: the freedom of information bill – for enhanced transparency and accounta-
bility of state institutions; the anti-trust bill – which may restrict the formation and exist-
ence of monopolies and oligopolies, opening up the economy to national and international 
investors; and the political-party reform bill – which would restrict party members from 
changing their party allegiances for non-ideological reasons, as well as regulate the inter-
nal financing of political parties (FES 2009). These bills would affect entrenched econom-
ic and political elites at the state and non-state, local, provincial and national levels. 
Against the background in which these elites control most institutions, however, one can 
understand why these bills have not yet been prioritised (see Carothers 1999, 153). 
Sustaining peace 
These institutional limitations generate the space for widespread violence across the Phil-
ippines. Violent conflict is related mainly to a number of ethnically-based armed groups in 
the western part of the southern island of Mindanao, including the MILF,32 as well as a 
country-wide communist insurgency – the Communist Party of the Philippines / New 
People’s Army (CPP/NPA) movement – and other criminal elements that feed on the 
state’s relative absence in some parts of the country. 
Whereas the peace process with the CPP/NPA movement is currently blocked,33 the peace 
process with the MILF in western Mindanao – the Bangsamoro region – is moving ahead 
as one of Aquino’s main priorities.34 As was suggested in several interviews (Manila, Da-
vao, Cotabato, New York), both the government of the Philippines (GPH) and part of the 
international community have their hopes on its success, which would not only bring some 
highly-needed stability to the region, but would also set the stage for conspicuous govern-
ance reforms and economic development in the poorest region of the Philippines. Moreo-
                                                 
32  Other armed groups include the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), founded in 1969, during 
Marcos’s rule. The MILF formally split from the MNLF in 1984, after the 1976 MNLF-led peace pro-
cess with the government of the Philippines. In 1991 the Abu Sayyaf Group split from the MNLF and is 
considered a terrorist group for its engagement in Yihad and kidnap for ransom. Abu Sayyaf is mainly 
located in the islands west of Mindanao. 
33  Some of the reasons for this blockade include that agreements between the CPP/NPA leadership and 
the GPH do not guarantee agreement from lower CPP/NPA cadres, as the movement has become more 
decentralised. Additionally, one of the root causes for this conflict is the relative absence of the state in 
some parts of the country – an issue that is difficult to remedy and would require deep-seated social and 
political reforms (Interviews Manila). 
34  The peace strategy of the GPH, according to the International Contact Group (International Crisis 
Group 2012, 2), is based on the “principle of convergence”, or, in other words, bringing together three 
elements: a peace agreement with the MILF, the reform of the ARMM and the review of the 1996 final 
peace agreement with the MNLF. Allegedly this “convergence strategy” tries to amend the lack of in-
clusiveness of the 1996 final peace agreement by unifying the Bangsamoro behind one comprehensive 
peace agreement. One sign of this increased commitment to inclusiveness is the participation in the 
process of a number of (local) civil society organisations representing marginalised groups, for example 
women, youth and indigenous peoples. 
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ver, if successfully accomplished, these reforms would, in turn, constitute a role model for 
the entire Philippines (Interviews Manila, Cotabato), presenting a window of opportunity 
for change. 
However, once the peace agreement between the GPH and the MILF has been signed, 
peace sustainability will depend, first, on the inclusiveness of the process itself and the 
commitment of local actors to comply with the agreements.35 Second, it will depend on 
the emergence of inclusive and democratic institutions at both the national and regional 
                                                 
35  On the one hand, it might have been a positive sign that after the May 2013 elections, the elected 
ARMM governor and deputy governor, and all ARMM provincial governors, were GPH-backed and 
welcomed by the MILF, and therefore allegedly supportive of the peace process (Philstar 2013). On the 
other hand, politics in the Bangsamoro region – and the Philippines in general – are extremely complex, 
with many layers of family, clan, ethnic and national (power) allegiances playing diverse and changing 
roles over time (see Kreuzer 2012; Neumann 2010, 65; Rood 2013). Indeed according to the Interna-
tional Crisis Group, “the machinations of the archipelago’s elite are unpredictable and opaque and lie 
well beyond the national government's control” (2012, 2). 
Peace negotiations in the Bangsamoro region 
Past attempts to broker peace between the government of the Philippines and various insurgency groups 
in Mindanao have not succeeded and development in the region has stalled. Since the MILF splinted from 
the MNLF in 1984, it has been a consistent opponent and critic of peace deals reached between the GPH 
and the MNLF, including the 1996 final peace agreement with the MNLF based on the 1989-constituted 
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), which included some – but not all – of the Muslim-
populated provinces in western Mindanao.  
The 1996 final peace agreement failed for several reasons. First, for lack of inclusiveness of the peace 
process itself – many of the stakeholders to the conflict, such as the MILF, were either not included in the 
process and/or rejected it – and, second, for lack of implementation of the agreement. This lack of imple-
mentation was a result both of the lack of willingness on the part of the government of the Philippines, but 
also of the insufficient institutional capacity of the ARMM. Furthermore, this peace agreement resulted in 
the weakening of the MNLF against the MILF. By making the MNLF run such a weak institution as the 
ARMM, it not only enabled and protected traditional clan leaders in their competition for control of the 
provinces (see International Crisis Group 2012, 1), but it also strengthened the MILF in its appeal to fight 
for a real Bangsamoro government. 
In 2011, President Aquino was able to break the stalemate that started in 2008 after the Supreme Court 
declared the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domains unconstitutional. This agreement, which 
former President Arroyo had negotiated with the MILF, would have increased the power of the ARMM. 
On 15 October 2012, the GPH and the MILF signed the Bangsamoro Framework Agreement, to be com-
plemented by four annexes – on regulating transitional arrangements, on power-sharing, wealth-sharing 
and “normalisation” (meaning in effect disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration) – before Decem-
ber 2012. The framework agreement and its annexes were to set the stage for a comprehensive peace- and 
state-building agenda for the Bangsamoro region. The Transition Commission has been nominated – 
constituted by MILF and GPH officials – but is (temporarily) disabled, because only two of the four an-
nexes have been agreed upon: the annexes on “regulating transitional arrangements” (February 2013) and 
on “wealth-sharing” (July 2013). The two other annexes are still being negotiated. 
As a high-ranking MILF leader asserted in an interview in March 2013, the initial vision was for the 
ARMM to be dismantled and a new and more encompassing autonomous region to ensue. This region 
would function as a multi-party parliamentary democracy with a ministerial form of government, and at 
least one democratic political party, namely the one that the MILF would create. From July 2013 onward, 
however, there has been an increase in violence between the government of the Philippines and an MILF 
splinter group – the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) – which is partly supported by the 
MNLF and threatens to disrupt the peace negotiations. 
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levels (see box above). Support from the international (donor) community to ensure the 
inclusiveness and sustainability of the process and the post-peace process period could be 
crucial. For this we turn to the following section. 
4.2 Supporting peace and democracy from outside 
Contributing to sustainable peace? 
The conflict in Mindanao has long constituted one of the main priorities for donors regard-
ing their country strategies. Indeed, the international community has been fully involved 
in the various peace processes. For instance, since 2005, there has been an International 
Monitoring Team (IMT), whose activities include monitoring the ceasefire and supervis-
ing socio-economic agreements between the GPH and the MILF negotiation panels.36 Fur-
thermore, in 2009 the parties to the conflict established an International Contact Group 
(ICG), whose mandate is “to maintain trust between the parties and ensure the implemen-
tation of mutually agreed approaches” (Conciliation Resources 2013).37 
Arguably, through the ICG, the international community plays an important role in ac-
companying the process and ensuring the parties’ compliance. Still, the leverage of the 
ICG, with regards to the negotiating panels, is limited (Rood 2012). On the other hand, the 
presence of the IMT, and its local civil society component, guarantees the inclusion of 
grass-roots CSOs in the monitoring process. Both mechanisms are therefore contributing 
towards the inclusiveness of the peace process initiated in 2011. 
But the sustainability of any peace process – as we saw in the failure of the 1996 final 
peace agreement – also depends on a sufficiently capable and inclusive institutional 
framework, at the national and regional levels, that is able to draw the parties to imple-
ment the agreements. Although the Creditor Reporting System of the OECD/DAC only 
reports commitments and disbursements at an aggregate level, it already indicates some 
interesting trends in this regard. 
Unsurprisingly perhaps, over the past 10 years, in average, a quarter of the sectoral assis-
tance on “governance and civil society” to the Philippines was dedicated to “conflict peace 
and security”, specifically to “civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolu-
tion”.38 Most relevant, however, the rest of this sector assistance has been primarily con-
centrated on public sector institutional development and capacity-building, with a special 
focus on judicial and legal reform, including anti-corruption measures, mainly financed by 
the United States and the EU. As in El Salvador, there is, at least officially, an almost total 
absence of assistance towards capacitating the legislative, political parties or the media. 
Assistance to “democratic participation and civil society organisations”, human rights, and 
                                                 
36  The IMT is constituted by Malaysia (also the facilitator to the process), Indonesia (which joined in 
2013), Libya, Brunei, Japan, Norway and the EU. 
37  The ICG comprises four countries – Japan, United Kingdom, Turkey and Saudi Arabia – and four in-
ternational NGOs: Muhammadiyah, The Asia Foundation, the Human Dialogue Centre and Concilia-
tion Resources. 
38  The largest contributors in this sub-sector have been the United States, Germany and Australia; Nor-
way, Spain and Japan are some distance behind. 
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“women’s equality organisations and institutions” is extremely scattered along the whole 
spectrum of OECD donors.39 For the past 10 years, Germany has been the most consistent 
supporter of this type of assistance – with an average support of US$ 3.5 million a year, as 
reported by the OECD/DAC. 
In the Bangsamoro region, the Bangsamoro Framework Agreement signed in October 
2012 gave a new impetus to donors regarding their commitments in the region. However, 
the absence of a thorough development plan for the new Bangsamoro institutional frame-
work is leading some donors to herd in front of the exit line in anticipation of such a plan, 
and other donors, for example the Japan International Cooperation Agency, the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank, to support the transition 
to the incipient Bangsamoro government mostly through advising, training and capacity-
building (World Bank 2013). 
Challenges and opportunities of supporting peace and democracy 
One of the most obvious challenges to sustainable peace in the Philippines is that the GPH 
has a number of different peace processes running in parallel, with no integrated strategy 
and different paces of development, respectively. Aside from the peace process with the 
country-wide communist insurgency (the CPP/NPA), only in the Bangsamoro region are 
there several peace processes running at the same time: the current peace process with the 
MILF and the revision of the failed 1996 peace process with the MNLF. Additionally, 
there are other armed groups in this region that the government is not engaging with in 
diplomatic talks, such as the MILF splinter group – the BIFF – and the Abu Sayyaf group. 
Another important challenge for sustainable peace is that the peace process with the MILF 
is advancing much more slowly than expected. Both parties to the conflict – the MILF and 
the GPH – have repeatedly postponed completion of the annexes to the Bangsamoro 
Framework Agreement (Minda News 2013). By October 2013, only two of the four an-
nexes had been agreed upon – the annexes on “regulating transitional arrangements” (Feb-
ruary 2013) and on “wealth-sharing” (July 2013) – delaying completion of the annexes on 
“power-sharing” and “normalisation” (meaning in effect disarmament, demobilisation and 
re-integration). The Transition Commission, therefore, also delayed the drafting of the 
Basic Law, as the Commission “cannot proceed with the drafting of the Basic Law until 
and unless the parties of the negotiations conclude the negotiations on the Annexes” 
(UNYPAD 2013; Inquirer News 2013). This means that concrete features of the state de-
sign that both the GPH and the MILF envision for the Bangsamoro region have yet to be 
decided upon. Additionally, the international community can only engage in an advisory 
role. 
                                                 
39  According to the Creditor Reporting System of the OECD/DAC, the three largest donors to the Philip-
pines for the 10 years prior to 2011 included Japan (40 per cent of total official development assis-
tance), the United States (17 per cent), and Australia (10 per cent). Behind them are Germany (5 per 
cent), the EU (3 per cent) and Spain (2 per cent). From 2002 to 2011, total official development assis-
tance averaged approximately US$ 940 million every year (for a total GDP in 2011 of US$ 224 billion 
for approximately 95 million inhabitants), of which, in average, approximately 12 per cent – or US$ 92 
million – was dedicated to “government and civil society”; see online: http://stats.oecd.org. These data 
have to be taken with special prudence, as, for instance, the World Bank is one of the largest multilat-
eral donors to the Philippines, but assistance is not reported through the OECD system. 
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Related to the absence of a plan for the constitution of a Bangsamoro state, donor officials 
complain about the lack of a functioning coordinating agency at the regional level 
(Interviews Manila, Cotabato). The nascent coordinating agency in the Bangsamoro 
region, the Bangsamoro Development Authority (BDA), does not yet have the capacity to 
coordinate international assistance. The consequence of which is, first, the continued 
presence of donor-led programmes, for instance, the World Bank-led Mindanao Trust 
Fund for Reconstruction and Development Program, which started in 2006 as a 
mechanism for development partners to pool resources and coordinate their support 
(through the World Bank), and, second, informally coordinated assistance elsewhere 
(Interviews Manila).40 
In contrast to the Bangsamoro region, donor coordination at the national level works par-
ticularly well. The central institution is the Philippines Development Forum, which is co-
chaired by the GPH and the World Bank.41 However, as we saw in the case of El Salva-
dor, increased capacity in policy planning and donor coordination at the national level 
increases the leverage of partner countries vis-à-vis the donor community. This means that 
the government has an increased prerogative to decide which areas it wants international 
donors to support and focus on. 
Moreover, the general fear of causing instability prevents the GPH from engaging in struc-
tural reforms, such as, for instance, addressing institutional capture by political dynasties 
(Kreuzer 2012, III; Kreuzer 2009, 59). As a consequence, bilateral and multilateral donors 
focus most of their democracy-support and state-building activities on strengthening or 
capacitating public sector institutions. Some donors also support the executive in several 
of its initiatives in the fields of transparency, citizen participation, accountability, and 
technology and innovation, designed in consultation with civil society networks, business 
leaders and associations, and development partners (Open Government Partnership 2013; 
AusAID 2012). Still, the focus on CSOs is leading both the executive and most external 
donors to neglect those institutions that would most directly contribute towards creating a 
stronger link between the state and society, namely the legislative and the political party 
system (Merkel 2010, 167; see also Keefer 2005; Keefer 2008). 
Two international actors directly support political parties in the Philippines, namely 
UNDP – limited in funds – and, crucially, the German political party foundations.42 The 
                                                 
40  Hence, while donors may include local actors in the planning phase of their activities, donors are un-
likely to empower local actors to take on coordinating responsibilities. As was suggested in several in-
terviews (Manila, Cotabato), the European Union allegedly has an especially bad reputation in terms of 
delegating coordinating powers to local actors – as I was told by an EU representative in Manila on 
condition of anonymity – because local organisations generally lack the capacity to manage these re-
sponsibilities. 
41  With regards to Mindanao, for example, there is the “Mindanao Working Group” and a Mindanao De-
velopment Authority (MinDA), which coordinates donor activities for the whole of Mindanao. Accord-
ing to one donor official, however, they are mostly focused on socio-economic development in the en-
tire region rather than on specific peace-building activities in western Mindanao (Interview Manila). 
Relations between MinDA and the BDA are tense, as their particular competencies have not been clear-
ly defined yet. 
42  These foundations usually work with political parties with whom they share core values and principles. 
Therefore, the social-democrat Friedrich Ebert Foundation works with the centre-left “Akbayan” party 
list, the liberal Friedrich Naumann Foundation works with the (President’s) Liberal Party, and the con-
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goal of the German party foundations is, on the one hand, to support the passage of a 
comprehensive political-party reform law and, on the other hand, to help existing or new-
ly-created political parties to strengthen their democratic credentials. However, a lack of 
commitment to political-party reform limits their impact. 
In conclusion, the risk-averse government of the Philippines and the risk-averse interna-
tional community are contributing to the lack of structural reforms that would lead to-
wards inclusive institutions and peace sustainability. The stalled political-party reform 
law, the freedom of information law and the anti-trust law constitute potential windows of 
opportunity in this regard. However, those actors who are willing to put pressure on state 
institutions to reform – some local NGOs and the German political party foundations – 
lack the clout to compel those institutions to act. Like-minded countries, as well as multi-
lateral organisations, could be in a different position, but only if they are ready to use their 
diplomatic leverage to push for reforms. Though its potential for success is unclear, dip-
lomatic pressure might, in the short term, be paramount for reform. Strengthening state 
structures and CSOs remains – just as in El Salvador – the long and uncertain way towards 
change. 
5 Conclusion 
Summing up, both case studies analysed in this paper include examples of the shared chal-
lenges that international donors face when supporting democratic consolidation and sus-
tainable peace. Despite obvious differences among the two countries, similarities related 
to the dimensions of statehood (Grävingholt / Ziaja / Kreibaum 2012), the governing and 
government systems, as well as the levels of state-building and democracy-support pro-
grammes allow for a comparative analysis of the specific challenges faced by donors re-
garding their increased commitments towards effective state-building and democracy-
support policies. 
The analysis of both case studies has confirmed, first, the fact that donors mainly focus on 
capacity-building rather than on building an inclusive and democratic institutional frame-
work (Call 2012). This is the result of what I called the ownership dilemma, according to 
which the partners’ resistance to structural reforms meets the donors’ unwillingness to 
pressure partner governments for reforms. The Philippines offers a clear example of this 
ownership dilemma, as Congress’s unwillingness to pass a number of reform bills is met 
by an international community unwilling to pressure the government to prioritise those 
bills. In the case of El Salvador, however, we saw how diplomatic pressure can help over-
come the gridlock resulting from this ownership dilemma. The international community 
decided to assist the newly-independent judiciary by pressuring the Salvadorian govern-
ment to respect its rulings and uphold the resulting reforms. And it worked. 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
servative Konrad Adenauer Foundation decided to support the constitution of a new fully-democratic 
political party, the Centrist Democratic Party, after having worked for years (unsuccessfully) with for-
mer President Arroyo’s political party. 
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Second, in both cases, the unaddressed conflicting objectives between long-term peace 
and democracy, and immediate institutional reforms are at the root of the ownership di-
lemma and of the relative ineffectiveness of state-building and democracy-support poli-
cies. According to Grimm and Leininger (2012, 405), “if local and international actors 
fail to address these conflicts constructively, they are likely to hinder the effectiveness of 
democracy promotion in transitional, post-war, and developmental contexts.” In other 
words, by aiming at short-term stability, donors hamper the democratic consolidation pro-
cess. This is the case because, third, the advent of sustainable peace is directly related to 
the democratic consolidation process, that is, both goals are not only compatible but mutu-
ally reinforcing. 
Supporting the executive in its ability to plan, coordinate and deliver – as well as increas-
ing the capacity of CSOs to implement and monitor projects – is certainly necessary for 
democratic consolidation and peace sustainability. These policies, however, do not neces-
sarily touch upon entrenched social and political structures. In both countries, other forms 
of support, such as political party or parliamentary assistance, are also urgently needed 
(Diamond 1994, 32; Keefer 2008; Lipset 1994). Actors that directly implement this kind 
of assistance, however, are limited in number (i.e. political party foundations and interna-
tional organisations), funding and leverage. Bilateral donors could decisively assist them, 
either through direct funding or by continuing to support local CSOs to urge governments 
to reform. At the same time, bilateral donors could also use diplomatic channels to support 
the political mandates of regional organisations, Special Rapporteurs or international or-
ganisations such as UNDP, thereby strengthening their leverage vis-à-vis local elites.43 
Furthermore, international actors have the responsibility to embrace and act upon emerg-
ing windows of opportunity to carry out their potential in consolidating peace and democ-
racy.  
  
                                                 
43  On the need to use diplomacy, aid conditionality, and/or international and regional organisations to 
enhance external actors’ legitimacy in supporting inclusive processes, see Call (2012, 274).  
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Lists of interview dates and interviewees 
Interviews in San Salvador, El Salvador 
Day ID Origin  Works as/for 
12.11.2012 1 Domestic Academia 
2 International Bilateral Agency 
13.11.2012 3 International Bilateral Agency 
4 Domestic NGO 
14.11.2012 5 International Bilateral Agency 
6 International Multilateral Agency 
7 Domestic Media / Government 
15.11.2012 8 Domestic NGO 
 9 Domestic Government 
16.11.2012 10 Domestic  NGO 
11 Domestic Politician (FMLN) 
19.11.2012 12 Domestic NGO 
13 Domestic Politician (FMLN) 
14 International Bilateral Agency 
15 Domestic Politician / Government 
20.11.2012 16 International Regional Organisation 
17 International Regional Organisation 
18 International Multilateral Agency 
19 International Multilateral Agency 
21.11.2012 20 International INGO 
21 Domestic Government 
22.11.2012 22 Domestic Local Government 
23 Domestic Politician (ARENA) 
24 Domestic Politician (ARENA) 
23.11.2012 25 International INGO 
26 International Regional Organisation 
27 Domestic Academy / Think Tank 
24.11.2012 28 International NGO 
29 Domestic Local Government 
30 Domestic NGO 
Kimana Zulueta-Fülscher 
30 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interviews in Washington, DC, USA 
 
03.12.2012 42 International Multilateral Agency 
43 International Bilateral Agency 
04.12.2012 44 International INGO 
45 International Regional Organisation 
46 International INGO 
47 International Multilateral Agency 
05.12.2012 48 International INGO 
49 International INGO 
50 International INGO 
51 International INGO 
52 International INGO 
53 International INGO 
06.12.2012 54 International Regional Organisation 
55 International Bilateral Agency 
56 Domestic (ESV) Academia / Think Tank 
57 International Academia / Think Tank 
07.12.2012 58 International  INGO 
59 International Bilateral Agency 
31 Domestic Local Government 
26.11.2012 32 International Regional Organisation 
33 Domestic Politician (ARENA) 
34 Domestic Business / NGO 
27.11.2012 35 International Media 
36 Domestic Business / NGO 
37 Domestic Business / NGO 
28.11.2012 
38 VISIT TO 
PRISON 
39 International Bilateral Agency 
40 Domestic Government 
29.11.2012 41 Domestic Media 
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60 International Regional Organisation 
61 International INGO 
62 International INGO 
63 International Multilateral Organisation 
08.12.2012 64 International INGO 
 
 
Interviews in Manila, Philippines 
 
12.02.2013 65 International Bilateral Agency 
66 International Bilateral Agency 
67 Domestic Bilateral Agency 
68 Domestic Academia / Think Tank  
13.02.2013 69 International INGO 
70 International INGO 
14.02.2013 71 Domestic Bilateral Agency 
72 International Bilateral Agency 
73 International INGO 
74 Domestic Business / NGO 
75 Domestic NGO 
76 Domestic NGO 
15.02.2013 77 International Bilateral Agency 
78 International Bilateral Agency 
79 International Bilateral Agency 
80 International INGO 
16.02.2013 81 Domestic NGO 
18.02.2013 82 Domestic Academia / Think Tank 
83 Domestic NGO 
19.02.2013 84 International Bilateral Agency 
85 Domestic Government 
20.02.2013 86 Domestic Media 
21.02.2013 87 International Bilateral Agency 
88 International Multilateral Organisation 
Kimana Zulueta-Fülscher 
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89 Domestic University / Think Tank 
90 Domestic NGO 
22.02.2013 91 Domestic INGO 
92 Domestic Academia / Think Tank 
93 Domestic Politician / Government 
 
 
Interviews in Davao, Mindanao, Philippines 
 
23.02.2013 94 Domestic NGO 
95 Domestic NGO 
25.02.2013 96 Domestic NGO 
97 Domestic NGO 
98 Domestic Local Government 
99 Domestic Local Government 
26.02.2013 100 Domestic NGO 
101 Domestic NGO 
102 Domestic Academia / Think Tank 
103 Domestic Government 
27.02.2013 104 Domestic NGO 
105 Domestic Academia / Think Tank 
106 Domestic INGO 
Interviews in Cotabato, Mindanao/ARMM, Philippines 
 
28.02.2013 107 Domestic NGO 
01.03.2013 108 Domestic Local Government 
109 Domestic Local Government 
02.03.2013 110 Domestic NGO 
111 International Multilateral Agency 
112 International Multilateral Agency 
113 International Multilateral Agency 
114 International Multilateral Agency 
03.03.2013 115 Domestic Local Government 
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Interviews in Manila, Philippines 
 
04.03.2013 116 International INGO 
117 International INGO 
118 Domestic NGO 
119 International INGO 
05.03.2013 120 Domestic Government 
121 International Multilateral Agency 
122 International Bilateral Agency 
06.03.2013 123 Domestic Government 
124 International Bilateral Agency 
07.03.2013 125 International Regional Organisation 
126 International Regional Organisation 
08.03.2013 127 Domestic Government 
128 Domestic Government 
 
 
Interviews in Brussels, Belgium 
 
19.03.2013 129 International Multilateral Agency 
130 International Multilateral Agency 
 
 
Interviews in New York, NY, USA 
 
17.10.2013 131 International Multilateral Agency 
132 International Multilateral Agency 
133 International Multilateral Agency 
134 International Multilateral Agency 
21.10.2013 135 International Multilateral Agency 
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